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CITIZEN’S CO-PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY AS A 
SYMPTOM OF STATE FAILURE: 






The growing interest in co-production of public services reflects the 
need to liberate from the dichotomy between state and market provision. 
Whereas the concept of co-production is not new, it gained broader recognition 
among public administration scholars in recent years. What is characteristic for 
the academic discourse on this idea, is a strong focus on the benefits of co-
production such as effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and quality of 
public services. This article provides more critical insight into co-production of 
public security by exploring the phenomenon of vigilantism in South Africa. 
The major aim of this article is to examine the major reasons for the expansion 




Co-production of public services is now among the hottest topics in the 
international academic discourse in the area of public management. However, 
this concept itself is not a recent invention. It appeared in the American 
literature during the 60s; however, the first wave of greater interest in this model 
was triggered by the work of a research team at the University of Indiana in the 
1970s and early 1980s (Parks et al. 1981). A new aspect of the theoretical debate 
in recent years is the perception of co-production as a potential strategy to 
address the challenges faced by modern welfare states (Pestoff, Osborne and 
Brandsen 2006), or as a missing element in the debates on the reform of 
democracies and welfare states (Pestoff 2006). The initial discourse on co-
production had a rather descriptive orientation, and was based on the 
recognition of the complex character of public service delivery, which was 
different from typical production schemes. A particular insight was that many 
public services cannot be produced solely by the providers, and require a more 
or less extensive engagement by the customers. For instance, a public school 
cannot provide a good quality education without efforts by the students; and a 
public library is unable to ensure a high level of book circulation without the 
contributions from its patrons (De Witte and Geys 2012). Co-production, 
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therefore, was initially perceived as an inevitable component of public service 
delivery. 
However, the evolution of the idea of co-production, and the evolution 
of the theoretical discourses on public service deliveries, opened room for more 
normative interpretations of co-production as a response to the inefficiency of 
both the bureaucratic and the market models of public service provision. 
Furthermore, the concept evolved in line with a broader vision of participatory 
and collaborative governance. Today, co-production is not limited to the 
customers’ engagement in the direct service delivery, but also includes 
participatory arrangements for policy designs, financing and the evaluation of 
public services (Bovaird and Löffler 2012).  
Along the way, advocates of co-production have unveiled an extensive 
catalogue of its potential benefits. These include: better quality of services; 
potential for cost reduction; increased trust between citizens and governments; 
and the greater engagement of citizens in the public domain. Such enthusiasm 
for co-production and its promises is justifiable within the context of its 
evolution, where disappointment with both the traditional, bureaucratic model 
of service delivery and the adverse effects of extensive marketization have 
fostered a search for a “third way.” Nonetheless, I argue that it is crucial not 
only to focus on the strengths and potential benefits associated with co-
production, but also to recognize its “dark side.” 
This article sheds light on the dark side of co-production by describing 
the vigilantism movement in South Africa. The major aim of this article is to 
provide an insight into factors that led to emergence of this phenomenon. 
Discussion on South African experiences with vigilantism is preceded by more 
general considerations about citizens’ co-production of public safety.  
 
CONTROVERSIES AROUND CO-PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
It is clear that crime control and crime prevention might be more 
effective thanks to contributions from citizens. For instance, Meijer (2012) 
describes the Dutch Burgernet project and the positive effects it entailed, where 
residents of selected neighbourhoods cooperated with the police in dealing with 
minor crimes. In the broader context of public safety, volunteer fire departments 
are widely used, and are probably one of the most disseminated forms of co-
production (Haynes and Stein 2014). 
However, Brewer and Grabosky (2014) expose the dark side of public 
safety co-production, as illustrated by the history of vigilantism and lynching in 
the United States. According to their study, neighbourhood watches are the 
largest form of crime prevention in the U.S., and cover the residential areas of 
over 40% of Americans. Some positive results of their activities are evident, 
including a decreased fear of crime in some areas, or a higher citizens’ 
satisfaction with police performance. But despite these benefits, Brewer and 
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Grabosky unveil numerous challenges associated with this police-community 
co-production.  
First of all, they argue that crime control provided by unprofessional 
services can imply a higher risk of power abuse and excessive harm. But what 
is equally important, is the risk that some groups might use neighbourhood 
watches to introduce their own “safety” regime outside of state control. There 
is evidence that some neighbourhood watches target selected groups of citizens, 
e.g. ethnic minorities (Brewer and Grabosky 2014). Obviously, not all 
participants in police-community groups are motivated by a sense of civic virtue 
and public interest. For some of them, it might be a vehicle to pursue their own 
vision of social order that is not compatible with existing laws. In other words, 
it might be used as a strategy for capturing public services, in order to impose a 
specific political and ideological view. A lack of accountability to the 
community and the state invigorates this threat. Hence, co-production in crime 
control appears to be a particularly risky endeavour, which may even result in a 
direct and serious challenge to fundamental human rights, including personal 
safety and freedom. Co-production is therefore not only an issue for the 
effectiveness of the public service provision, but also is related to securing the 
key values of a democratic society.  
 
THE NATURE OF VIGILANTISM IN SOUTH AFRICA  
“Fifty-one vigilante attacks have been recorded in Khayelitsha over the 
past seven months – and up to nine mob justice incidents occur in the area every 
month. Khayelitsha Cluster Commander Major-General Johan Brand said the 
statistics included murders, attempted murders and cases of assault with intent 
to do grievous bodily harm as recorded at Khayelitsha’s five police stations. 
Khayelitsha, Masiphumelele and Dunoon have been marred by a spate of 
vigilante attacks in recent months. While 51 incidents were reported to police 
stations in Lingulethu West, Khayelitsha, Harare, Lwandle and Macassar 
between April and October, 69 similar cases were reported over the same period 
last year, Brand said. 
Three years ago, Western Cape Premier Helen Zille identified Khayelitsha as a 
problem area and established the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate a breakdown in relations between police and the community,” as 
reported on the IOL news portal dated on 4 November 2015 (Dano 2015).  It is 
one of many reports from recent years about vigilante attacks in South African 
major cities.  
However, an increasing problem of vigilantism is not a recent addition 
to the list of challenges faced by this country. According to the report of the 
Department of Community Safety of the Provincial Government of the Western 
Cape, there has been an increase of vigilante incidents since at least 2001 
(Haefele 2006). Buur and Jensen (2004) noted that some forms of vigilantism 
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have already developed in the apartheid state. Some of those formations served 
as a “hidden hand” of the regime, while others have been supported by liberation 
forces. According to Schaerf (2001), apartheid era vigilantism could be 
characterized by state-orchestrated violence against specific groups of citizens, 
whereas in the post-apartheid state it is represented primarily by civilian-
initiated movements set up in reaction to increasing levels of crime. Another 
new form of vigilantism are organizations providing some security services for 
a fee. The emergence of vigilantism in the post-apartheid state is usually linked 
with the establishment of PAGAD (People Against Gangs and Drugs). This 
group formed in 1996 was initially aimed at tackling high incidence of drugs 
and gangs among the young population. However, it has quickly transformed 
into a radical, paramilitary group planting bombs and killing people (Power and 
Vermooten 2009). PAGAD declared jihad against drug dealers from the city of 
Cape Town and over a few years has murdered around 100 people, not only 
those involved in drug trade, but also random individuals (Martin). Moreover, 
there is some evidence that some PAGAD members were actually involved in 
the drug trade they were fighting against (Buur and Jensen 2004).  
Another form of vigilantism in South Africa are people’s courts defined 
by Swanepol, Duvenhage and Coetzee (2011) as “community-based informal 
structure that takes over the judicial function of the state within that community 
by acting outside the law as judge, jury and executioner with the aim of 
providing order in the community through meeting out violent punishment to 
alleged wrongdoers.”  People’s courts could be perceived as a more advanced 
form of vigilantism that goes beyond policing and involves performing judicial 
functions of the state by non-state actors. Similar to community policing, the 
people’s courts are rooted in historical institutions. Informal courts existed in 
the rural parts of South Africa from the arrival of the first magistrates. 
Urbanization and rapid growth of townships only created advantageous 
conditions for further expansion of this form of non-state judiciary (Burman and 
Schaerf 1990).   
The approach of post-apartheid governments towards vigilantism has 
been rather mixed. The African National Congress has adopted an eclectic 
strategy to address the increasing problem of crime. It has primarily aimed at 
legitimizing the state police. At the same time, the concept of community 
policing has been also recognized as one of the major instruments 
supplementing state’s intervention (Super 2015). It should be noted, though, 
that there were no significant initiatives leading to more formalized and 
structured involvement of vigilante movements into partnerships with the state 
institutions (Schaerf 2001). 
The nature of vigilantism in South Africa is similar to other countries 
where this phenomenon could be observed, yet it also has some country-specific 
features. For many authors discussing this phenomenon, it is clear that the 
emergence of the vigilantism movement in South Africa has been triggered by 
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the state’s incapacity. International comparative studies demonstrate that 
vigilantism does not play a significant role in countries where the state provides 
its security institutions with adequate capacities (Hoffman 2012). Wherever the 
state performs its core functions more or less effectively, there is no need for 
the citizens’ self-organization. Dysfunctionality of the state creates a vacuum 
that could be maintained by other, non-state actors. 
The Guardian reported in 2015 that house robberies reached their 
highest ever annual recorded total, passing the 20,000 mark for the first time. 
Furthermore, street robberies increased by around 9.7% compared with the 
previous year (Smith 2015). It is obvious that security problems in South 
African cities have not been effectively mitigated and the state police fail to 
provide citizens with basic level of security. More affluent people react to this 
by hiring more private security companies to protect their property and ensure 
personal security. The number of officers working for private security 
companies has already doubled the number of police officers. As a percentage 
of GDP, South Africa has the largest private security sector in the world 
(Abrahamson and Williams 2010). For those who cannot afford private security 
coverage, civilian-initiated vigilantism movements remain the only option to 
increase the level of personal security.  
State’s incapacity not only creates a demand for vigilantism, but also 
encourages vigilante groups by perceptions that their members would not face 
any counter-measures from the state (Gutteridge and Spence 1997). If the state 
is unable to provide security to the population, it will not effectively oppose the 
groups aiming at taking responsibility for this task. State’s absence or passivity 
is an invitation to take control over the public goods (in this case – public 
security) that are not properly managed via state intervention. In that sense 
vigilantism is also a strategy for establishing a new legal-political order (Buur 
2006) or capturing the state by the groups building their authority on capacity 
to ensure some level of security to the population of a given territory.  
Gutteridge and Spence  (1997) also noted that vigilantism in South 
Africa (in Latin America too) is fostered by the dominant culture of violence. 
This culture has strengthened by the rhetoric of post-apartheid governments 
where the need for radical and brutal reaction against crime was emphasized. 
High acceptance to violence manifested in the state’s policy encourages non-
state actors and creates an obstacle to holding them accountable for any abuses 
or excessive use of force.  Furthermore, a high number of human rights 
violations committed by state officers devastates the citizens’ trust of the state 
and naturally turn the population towards vigilante groups.  
It should be underlined that the state’s incapacity is not the only 
explanation for the expansion of vigilantism available in the literature. 
Schuberth (2013) attempts to challenge this dominant approach to exploring this 
phenomenon by suggesting that vigilantism results from unwillingness of the 
ruling upper class to address security needs of poorer populations. In other 
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words, the problem does not lie in lack of resources or general weakness of state 
institutions, but in deliberate policy of the state driven by the interests of the 
ruling class. If we follow this interpretation, reducing the excessive role of 
vigilante groups would require not only increasing allocation of resources to 
public security forces, but first empowering poorer groups in the public policy 
processes. Otherwise, it is very likely that potential improvements in the 
capacity of state security forces will be allocated solely to provide better 
coverage to more affluent groups, strengthening the discriminatory patterns of 
access to public services.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Poor performance of state’s security apparatus is clearly one of the major 
factors triggering the expansion of vigilantism in South Africa. However, in the 
specific context of this country vigilantism seems to also be an important 
component of the traditional governance structures. This complex nature of 
public security co-production in South Africa is both an opportunity and a 
threat. Community engagement and experience in ensuring safety might be 
utilized to foster the effectiveness of official security forces. On the other hand, 
parallel, informal security groups remaining outside state’s control are prone to 
excessive use of force and serious violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. It 
is clear that the most effective solution to this dilemma would be to establish 
partnerships between community groups and state police forces based, for 
example, on above-describe Dutch Burgernet model.  
There is some evidence that such partnerships between state police and 
vigilante groups occur. As Baker (2002) noted, there is an increasing exchange 
of information about patterns of crime or policing techniques between state 
institutions and informal groups. However, the fundamental condition for such 
model to be implemented is to ensure that basic level of public security are 
effectively guaranteed by the state. Community groups may provide some 
added value, yet they could not replace the institutions subject to democratic 
governance and accountability schemes. 
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